

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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Remarks:

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Executive Secretary

9/1/82
Date

3637 (10-81)

State Dept. review completed




United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 8226182

August 31, 1982

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT



Interagency Group No. 28

TO : OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
AID - Mr. Gerald Pagano
CIA -
DOD - Col. John Stanford
USIA - Ms. Teresa Collins
JCS - Maj. Dennis Stanley
OMB - Mr. William Schneider

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SUBJECT: Notification of IG Meeting: Namibia/UNTAG

REFERENCE: Previous Notification

Attached is the paper for subject meeting on Thursday, September 2, at 10:30 in the AF Bureau Conference room, 3519, at the State Department.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

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Namibia/UNTAG - IG

Progress on our negotiations with all parties involved in the Namibia settlement process has reached the point where we need to take action now to provide for funding the U.S. contribution to UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group). While it is still difficult to predict with precision when final agreement will be reached, it is not unrealistic to be prepared for it in the near future. Given the legislative calendar for the next few months and our need to move very quickly with funding for UNTAG once we are ready to move forward with the UN plan, our best judgment is that the funding request to Congress should be part of the Continuing Resolution request for FY 1983. We may not have another opportunity until February, 1983, and we cannot afford to be without funding authority in this US-led negotiation for five months. To obtain that funding, the Secretaries of State and Defense could send a memorandum to the President asking that he approve and support such a request in the CR.

A settlement of the Namibia conflict by an agreement including the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola could well be one of the major foreign policy achievements of this Administration. Our support of the UNTAG operation is critical to its success and therefore to the whole settlement process. Moreover, this has been an implicit commitment of the United States since these negotiations first began in 1977.

There are two basic elements of the U.S. contribution to UNTAG: 1) our commitment to have DOD transport the peacekeeping forces and their equipment to Namibia and 2) our support, through a UN assessment, to the ongoing operations of those forces and the related activities of UNTAG's civilian component. Our best current estimates, and they are still estimates, are approximately \$80 million for the DOD-provided air/sealift and up to \$150 million in a US assessment for the UN to cover the U.S. share of a 12-month UNTAG operation.

Our Congressional strategy should emphasize the non-recurring nature of this UN effort. It is designed as a one time military-civilian plan to provide the basis for free elections and the transition to independence for Namibia. We know of course that Congress is not in a spending mood, but we believe that the unique and historical success a properly structured Namibia settlement in the context of Cuban withdrawal would represent should attract bi-partisan support. However, there

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will be no lobbying Congress on this issue until we have both the Namibia and Angola elements -- including Cuban withdrawal -- in hand. Should the Continuing Resolution request reach Congress at a time when we still do not have full agreement on a settlement we will need to reconsider this strategy.

At this initial IG meeting on UNTAG we hope to accomplish the following:

- brief those attending on the current state of play in the Namibia and Angola negotiations.
- discuss the UN cost figures and report on Department of State conversations with the UN on those figures.
- and consider options on how best to obtain Congressional approval for the funding requests. We will also need to consider what alternative assurances or other actions are necessary should a full agreement or settlement (to include Cuban troops withdrawal from Angola) not be in hand at the time the CR is before Congress.

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